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I. INTRODUCTION
Feminists distrust traditional legal methods, criticizing them for:
representing male power structures, considering only a male view of
the world, and ignoring a female view.1 To radical feminists, includ-
ing Catharine MacKinnon and Robin West, traditional legal methods
represent "male ways of thinking" because they are exclusive2 and be-
cause they analyze in masculine terms by drawing on hierarchical rea-
soning.3 Feminists believe that it is important to purge this male bias
from legal method and to inject women's real life experiences into
legal analysis.4 They fear, however, that use of traditional legal meth-
ods to expose and correct the bias would perpetuate the very exclusion
against which they rage.5 Therefore, feminists have turned to other
1. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829
(1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, 77 IowA L. lEv. 19 (1991);
Christine A. Littleton, In Search of a Feminist Jurisprudence, 10 HARv. WoMEN's
L.J. 1 (1987); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence.: An Es-
say, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio:
Feminist Methodologies and the Logic of Imagination, 70 TEx. L. REv. 109 (1991);
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1988).
2. See, e.g., CATHAuu A. MAcKwNoN, ToWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF =H STATE
xiii (1989) (exclusionary methods, such as rights, are male, limited, and limiting).
3. See, e.g., West, supra note 1.
4. As Linda McClain put it, "[fleminist jurisprudence has sought to bring the experi-
ence and voice of women to the jurisprudential enterprise, proposing an alterna-
tive conception of the person-or, at least, of women-based on female
experience of the world, feminine nature, or a 'different voice.'" Linda C. Mc-
Clain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Juris-
prudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1174 (1992) (citations omitted). See also
Jeanne-Marie Bates, Feminist Methodology: Influencing Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment Claims, 15 WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 143, 145 (1994) (Feminists
recognize that existing legal standards and concepts disadvantage women, and it
is the goal of feminist method and theory to expose these features in the law and
to suggest corrective measures. Through development of alternative conventions
which take better account of women's experiences and needs, workable tech-
niques are helping feminists to reach their goals.); West, supra note 1, at 65 ("We
need to flood the market with our own stories until we get one simple point
across: men's narrative story and phenomenological description of law is not wo-
men's story and phenomenology of law.").
5. See generally MACKwNON, supra note 2, at 84-154; Scales, supra note 1, at 1375,
1384-85. See also Bartlett, supra note 1, at 830-31 (feminists cannot "challenge
existing structures of power with the same [male] methods that have defined
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methods: "asking the woman question," feminist practical reasoning,
and consciousness-raising. Feminists call these methods "feminist
legal methods."6
Feminist scholarship employing feminist legal methods to trans-
form the law abounds. 7 Many feminist scholars have, however, ac-
what counts within those structures, as they may instead 'recreate the illegiti-
mate power structures that they are trying to identify and undermine.'") (cita-
tion omitted); Linda A. Hirshman, The Book of "A", 70 TEX. L. REV. 971, 973-74
(1992) ("Having found legal doctrines and methods that purported to be just and
appeared to be neutral, but produced results that grossly disadvantaged women,
... [fleminist scholars countered with methods of feminist practical reasoning...
[and] consciousness-raising... ."); Kathleen A. Lahey,... Until Women Them-
selves Have Told All That They Have to Tell..., 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 519,534-
37 (1985)(although it may be difficult to break from traditionally male scholar-
ship, feminist theory should be used in order for women to thrive); Mary Jane
Mossman, Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference It Makes, 3 Wis. Wo-
mN's L.J. 147, 149 (1987) (traditional legal methods are a barrier to challenging
the status quo).
6. See Bartlett, supra note 1. These three feminist legal methods are defined and
discussed in Part One of this Article.
7. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Power-
lessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259 (1993) (applying the woman
question to Miranda rights); Peter C. Alexander, Divorce and the Dischargeability
of Debts: Focusing on Women as Creditors in Bankruptcy, 43 CATH. U. L. REv.
351 (1994) (applying the woman question to bankruptcy); Leslie Bender, Teach-
ing Torts as if Gender Matters: Intentional Torts, 2 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L. 115
(1994) (applying the woman question to teaching torts); Mary Anne Bobinski, Wo-
men and H1V: A Gender-Based Analysis of a Disease and its Legal Regulation, 3
TFx J. WoMEN & L. 7 (1994) (applying the woman question to HV); Rebecca J.
Cook, International Protection of Women's Reproductive Rights, 24 N.Y.U. J. INyL
L. & POL. 645 (1992) (applying feminist practical reasoning to reproductive
health); Mary I. Coombs, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Contemporary
Proceedings, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1785 (1993) (applying the woman question to
judging); Jeanne M. Dennis, The Lessons of Comparable Worth: A Feminist Ver-
sion of Law and Economic Theory, 4 UCLA WoAfEN's L.J. 1 (1993) (applying femi-
nist practical reasoning to economic theory); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-
Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MmN. L.
REv. 1599, 1637-42 (1991) (applying feminist practical reasoning to self defense
doctrine as applied to battered women who use weapons against their abusers
during a time of quiescence); Sharon K. Hom, Female Infanticide in China: The
Human Rights Specter and Thoughts Toward (An)Other Vision, 23 CoLum. HuM.
RTs. L. REv. 249 (1992) (applying the woman question to female infanticide in
China); Herma Hill Kay, The Future of Women Law Professors, 77 IowA L. REv. 5
(1991) (applying the woman question and feminist practical reasoning to women
law professors); Jane Byeff Korn, Changing Our Perspective on Arbitration: A
Traditional and a Feminist View, 1991 U. IuL. L. REv. 67 (applying the woman
question to arbitration); Christine A. Littleton, Does it Still Make Sense to Talk
About 'Women"?, 1 UCLA WoamN's L.J. 15 (1991) (applying the woman question
to family/medical leave legislation and divorce); Kathleen M. McCauley, Com-
ment, Women on the European Commission and Court of Human Rights: Would
Equal Representation Provide More Effective Remedies?, 13 Dicta J. INT'L L. 151
(1994) (applying the woman question and feminist practical reasoning to interna-
tional human rights law and policy); A. Yassmine Rassam, "Mother," "Parent,"
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cepted and applied these methods without critical pause or question.8
There is an understandable appeal to hasty acceptance of these meth-
ods because "asking the woman question," engaging in feminist practi-
cal reasoning, and experiencing consciousness-raising symbolize the
goal of feminists to inject women's life experiences into legal analysis.9
Feminists, however, often fail to objectively evaluate their methods,
and consequently overestimate the symbolic value of those methods.
This Article uses the recently focused conflict between sexual har-
assment and the First Amendment to critically evaluate feminist legal
methods. Extrapolating from feminist legal scholarship, I demon-
strate how feminists would use their methods to analyze whether a
potential First Amendment defense to sexual harassment liability
represents and perpetuates the male bias inherent within traditional
legal methods. This analysis then serves as the basis of my critique. I
have chosen to evaluate feminist legal methods through the lens of a
potential First Amendment defense to sexual harassment liability for
two reasons. First, it forces careful, rather than mechanical, applica-
tion of feminist legal methods because resolution of the conflict be-
tween sexual harassment and the First Amendment calls for an
unwelcome compromise of principles important to feminism.1 0 In
turn, this application provides the necessary objectivity from which
critical evaluation of feminist legal methods can take place. Second,
the Supreme Court has not resolved the conflict.11 Thus, recognizing
and Bias, 69 IND. L.J. 1165 (1994) (applying the woman question to parenting);
John A. Robertson, Asking the "Woman Question" About Health Care Reform, 3
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1 (1994) (applying the woman question to health care re-
form); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives
from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589 (1986) (using personal expe-
rience and consciousness-raising to transcend the opposition of rights and
politics).
8. Of all the scholarship in Note 7 explicitly using "asking the woman question,"
feminist practical reasoning, or consciousness-raising, none of the articles discuss
or question the soundness of these methods. See supra note 7.
9. For example, Catharine MacKinnon describes feminist method as "recapitu-
lat[ing] as theory the reality it seeks to capture." MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 83.
Additionally, Deborah Rhode describes the feminist legal method of conscious-
ness-raising as "reflect[ing] the historical origins and contemporary agenda of
feminist legal theory." Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 617, 622 (1990). See also Goldfarb, supra note 7, at 1627 ("The cooperative
[meaning feminine] nature of the [consciousness-raising] exploration discourages
hierarchical [meaning masculine] arrangements within the group that would
reproduce, in part, the problem generating the need for gathering.") (citation
omitted).
10. The First Amendment preserves freedom to protest sexual objectification of wo-
men in the workplace, and sexual harassment laws protect women from sexual
objectification.
11. The Supreme Court has, however, under narrow circumstances approved the con-
stitutionality of Title VII against First Amendment attacks. See Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (upholding an aggravated battery criminal stat-
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the strengths and weaknesses of using feminist legal methods to
deconstruct the relationship between sexual harassment and First
Amendment law provides timely insight.
ute that enhanced the maximum sentence of two years imprisonment to seven
years if the defendant intentionally selected the victim based on race); R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (invalidating a bias-motivated disorderly
conduct criminal ordinance). The majority opinion in R.V., authored by Justice
Scalia and joined by Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, hinted in
dicta that Title VIrs prohibition of sexual harassment would survive First
Amendment scrutiny under the "secondary effects" doctrine. Id. at 2546. The
concurring opinion authored by Justice White, and joined by Justices Blackmun,
O'Connor, and Stevens, agreed in principle, but differed in rationale. Id. at 2557.
The White opinion, citing Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986),
stated that offensive speech may be regulated when it merges into conduct.
R.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2660 n.13 (1992). A year later, how-
ever, in a unanimous decision, the members of the Court merged their positions,
at least with respect to sexually derogatory fighting words, and stated, again in
dicta, that Title VII is a permissible content-neutral regulation of conduct. Wis-
consin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2200 (1993).
Other courts have summarily discussed the conflict between Title VII and the
First Amendment. See Berman v. Washington Times Corp., No. 92-2738, 1994
WL 750247, at *5 n.4-5 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 1994); Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.,
584 F. Supp. 419, 431 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) ("At once it must be recognized that a constitutional
First Amendment issue is raised. This issue can be framed as follows: can Title
VII prohibit people from verbally expressing themselves with language that is
not "obscene" under the legal definition of that term? It will be seen that this
issue need not be considered in this case. Nevertheless, it should be noted that
this issue is raised by the present kind of case."). Also, in Robinson v. Jackson-
ville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1534 (M.D. Fla. 1991), the court rejected
without discussion the defendant's argument that the First Amendment impedes
the remedy of injunctive relief. However, it did sua sponte state explicitly why
the hostile environment claim in that case would survive First Amendment
scrutiny:
No first amendment concern arises when the employer has no intention
to express itself.... [T]he pictures and verbal harassment are not pro-
tected speech because they act as discriminatory conduct in the form of
hostile environment.... [Tihe regulation of discriminatory speech in the
workplace constitutes nothing more than a time, place, and manner reg-
ulation of speech.... The standard for this type of regulation requires a
legitimate governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of speech,
content neutrality, and a tailoring of means to accomplish this interest.
The eradication of workplace discrimination is more than simply a legiti-
mate governmental interest, it is a compelling governmental inter-
est.... [F]emale workers at JSI are a captive audience in relation to the
speech that comprises the hostile work environment.... The free speech
guarantee admits great latitude in protecting captive audiences from of-
fensive speech. [If the speech at issue is treated as fully protected, and
the Court must balance the governmental interest in cleansing the work-
place of impediments to the equality of women, the latter is a compelling
interest that permits the regulation of the former and the regulation is
narrowly drawn to serve this interest.
Id. at 1534-35 (citations omitted).
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Part One of this Article defines "asking the woman question," femi-
nist practical reasoning, and consciousness-raising. It also explains
that feminists use these methods in three ways: 1) to expose bias
against women in traditional legal methods, 2) to rebuild decision-
making by including the woman's point of view, and 3) to convince
decisionmakers to employ feminist legal methods as a means to iden-
tify (and perhaps to legitimately justify) bias inherent in their
decisionmaking.
Part Two begins with a brief introduction to sexual harassment
and First Amendment law. It then explores how some feminists might
apply feminist legal methods to argue that a successful First Amend-
ment defense to sexual harassment liability embodies the maleness of
traditional legal methods.
In Part Three, however, I use this same application to demonstrate
two weaknesses inherent in feminist legal methods: 1) the methods
cannot distinguish bias against women ("bad bias") from bias that
may be advantageous to women ("good bias"), and 2) the methods can-
not convince many decisionmakers to employ them. This Part also
identifies and responds to several possible objections by feminists to
my critique.
Having demonstrated that there are weaknesses inherent in femi-
nist legal methods, Part Four encourages feminists to abandon the be-
lief that feminist goals in law must be obtained exclusively through
feminist legal methods. It suggests, instead, that feminists employ
various methods, such as traditional legal methods, feminist legal
methods, or a combination thereof, that resonate with decisionmakers.
By using reasoning familiar to decisionmakers, feminists may im-
prove communication with decisionmakers, and, in turn, may make
their arguments for feminist reform more persuasive. To illustrate
this point, Part Four offers arguments grounded in First Amendment
precedent by which feminists may defeat a First Amendment defense
to sexual harassment liability.
II. PART ONE: FEMINIST LEGAL METHODS: "ASKING THE
WOMAN QUESTION," FEMINIST PRACTICAL REASONING,
AND CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING
Feminists use feminist legal methods to pursue certain goals on
the feminist agenda. Feminists use "asking the woman question" to
expose bias against women in legal decisionmaking.12 Feminists then
12. "Asking the woman question" is a feminist method also used in other disciplines,
including philosophy and political theory. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 837 n.23
(citing Carol C. Gould, The Woman Question: Philosophy of Liberation and the
Liberation of Philosophy, in WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY: TOWARD A THEORY OF Lm-
ERAn'ON 5 (C. Gould & M. Wartofsky eds. 1976) (philosophy) and M.E. Hawkes-
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employ feminist practical reasoning and consciousness-raising to re-
build, or at least to imagine,13 unbiased decisionmaking. Feminists
also use feminist legal methods to urge decisionmakers to employ
those methods in order to strip bias against women from their deci-
sionmaking. Below, I describe feminist legal methods more fully and
their role in obtaining feminist goals in law.
1. "Asking the Woman Question"
"Asking the woman question" has three essential features. It seeks:
1) to identify bias against women implicit in legal rules and practices
that appear neutral and objective,14 2) to expose how the law excludes
the experiences and values of women,1 5 and 3) to insist upon applica-
tion of legal rules that do not perpetuate women's subordination.1 6
Employing this method, feminists search for bias against women hid-
den behind allegedly neutral decisionmaking by asking questions
about the relationship between the decisionmaking process and its im-
pact on women. These questions are known as "woman questions."
worth, Feminist Rhetoric: Discourses on the Male Monopoly of Thought, 16 PoL.
THaoRY 444, 452-56 (1988) (political theory)).
13. Imagination plays a fundamental role in feminist legal methods generally. See,
e.g., Ainsworth, supra note 7, at 262 (the feminist legal method of "[aisking the
woman question forces us to imagine a counterfactual world in which women's
experiences, perspectives, and behavior were taken into account in construing the
legal order. By measuring the actual legal order against this imagined world,
feminist methodology exposes assumptions that are deeply embedded within the
law.... ."); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV.
1279, 1303 (1987) ("[Clommon feminist goals and enterprises [include] trying to
imagine what a sexually equal society would look like, given that none of us has
ever seen one ... and trying to figure out ways of getting there, given that the
obstacles to sexual equality are so many and so strong."); Jennifer Nedelsky, The
Practical Possibilities of Feminist Theory, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1286, 1289 (1993)
("We need to imagine institutions that could handle... problems in a genuinely
feminist framework."); West, supra note 1, at 72 ("Feminism must envision a
post-patriarchal world, for without such a vision we have little direction. We
must use that vision to construct our present goals, and we should, I believe,
interpret our present victories against the backdrop of that vision.").
14. Bartlett, supra note 1, at 837, 846. Inasmuch as legal rules and practices reflect
politics, "[aisking the woman question reveals the ways in which political choice
and institutional arrangement contribute to women's subordination.... The wo-
man question reveals how the position of women reflects the organization of soci-
ety rather than the inherent characteristics of women." Id. at 829, 843. There is
considerable debate among feminists as to whether or not this bias is intentional.
Compare Ainsworth, supra note 7, at 317 ("The insight derived from asking the
woman question-that the underpinnings of legal doctrine unconsciously and un-
wittingly incorporate a bias favoring males.. . .") with Ann Scales, Feminist
Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2 UCLA WoNN's L.J. 1, 12 (1992) ("Neutrality
converts someone's personal preference into an allegedly objective fact; it con-
verts a subjectively felt injustice into an official legal claim.").
15. Bartlett, supra note 1, at 836-37.
16. Id. at 843.
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Heather Wishik, in her often-cited law review article To Question
Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist Jurisprudence,17 provides as
examples the following "woman questions":
(1) What have been and what are now all women's experiences of the "life
situation" addressed by the doctrine, process, or area of law under
examination?
(2) What assumptions, descriptions, assertions and/or definitions of experi-
ence, male, female, or ostensibly gender neutral, does the law make in this
area?
(3) What is the area of mismatch, distortion, or denial created by the differ-
ences between women's life experiences and the law's assumptions or im-
posed structures?
(4) What patriarchal interests are served by the mismatch?
(5) What reforms have been proposed in this area of the law or women's life
situation? How will these reform proposals, if adopted, affect women both
practically and ideologically?
(6) In an ideal world, what would this woman's life situation look like, and
what relationship, if any, would the law have to this future life situation?
(7) How do we get there from here? 18
Others have also set forth "woman questions." Janet Ainsworth of-
fers, "What would the law be like if women had been considered by the
drafters and interpreters of the law?"19 and Sharon K. Horn argues
that "woman questions" lead to other questions such as:
Who are the policy-makers? What values and experiences are they reflecting
and drawing upon? What are the intended and unintended consequences of a
monopoly of power by predominately male decision-makers in realms which
have a foreseeable disparate impact on women? How can future policy-mak-
ingbe informed by the excluded voices and perspectives of those at the bottom
of the political, economic, or patriarchal social hierarchy? How can these
voices and perspectives claim and exercise social transformative power with-
out becoming complicitous in resorting to the "Master" discourses, ideologies,
and political strategies? 2 0
If the answers to these "woman questions" reveal bias against women,
feminists discredit the decisionmaking process. Feminists then use
feminist practical reasoning and consciousness-raising to locate and
provide a woman's point of view to counterbalance the bias.
2. Feminist Practical Reasoning and Consciousness-raising
Feminist practical reasoning is a form of reasoning grounded in
contextualized and concrete reality.21 It focuses on reality and recog-
17. Heather Ruth Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist Juris-
prudence, 1 BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. 64 (1985).
18. Id. at 74-75 (altered from original).
19. Ainsworth, supra note 7, at 262.
20. Hom, supra note 7, at 274.
21. Goldfarb, supra note 7, at 1636-37 ("The hallmark of feminist practical reasoning
is its emphasis on context: on understanding the intricate details of complex
human situations that give rise to legal or other conflicts and, with the aid of
prior wisdom and experience, using this understanding to find solutions that are
tailored to the particularities of the situation.") (citations omitted); Carol Sanger,
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nizes competing interests within a legal issue.22 Feminist practical
reasoning also considers personal experiences reported by women par-
ticipating in consciousness-raising, which is a sharing of personal nar-
ratives that enables the discovery of common experiences among
women.23 By emphasizing competing interests and women's exper-
iences as articulated in consciousness-raising, feminist practical rea-
soning "offers a means of testing the validity of accepted legal
principles through the lens of the personal experience"24 and promises
to "force [the] justification of results based upon what interests [in-
cluding women's interests] are actually at stake."25 Thus, the
strength of feminist practical reasoning lies in its ability to demand
that decisionmakers: 1) acknowledge and consider all points of view,
including the woman's point of view revealed through consciousness-
raising; and 2) offer their "real" reasons for deciding issues that nega-
tively affect women.26 If successful, feminist practical reasoning and
Feminism and Disciplinarity: The Curl of the Petals, 27 Loy. Lk. L. REv. 225,
243 (1993) (Feminist practical reasoning is a "form of contextualized deliberation
that takes into account the material conditions of women's lives.").
22. Bartlett, supra note 1, at 854-58.
23. See id. at 866 ("Consciousness-raising provides a substructure for other feminist
methods-including the woman question and feminist practical reasoning-by
enabling feminists to draw insights and perceptions from their own experiences
and those of other women and to use these insights to challenge dominant ver-
sions of social reality."); Scales, supra note 1, at 1401.
Some of the most popular definitions of "consciousness-raising" include: Cath-
arine MacKinnon's, "the collective critical reconstitution of the meaning of wo-
men's social experience, as women live through it." MAcKINNON, supra note 2, at
83; Mar Matsuda's, "the collective discussion and consideration of the concrete,
felt experience of gender in order to identify commonalities and build a theory of
the cause, effect and means of eradication of sexist oppression." Mari J. Matsuda,
Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. RaV. 323, 359 (1987); Martha Minow's, "personal reporting of experience
in communal settings to explore what has not been said." Martha Minow, The
Supreme Court, 1986 Term: Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HAnv. L. REv.
10, 64 (1987); and Katharine Bartlett's, "interactive and collaborative process of
articulating one's experiences and making meaning of them with others who also
articulate their experiences." Bartlett, supra note 1, at 863-64.
In consciousness-raising, the articulation by a speaker of an experience to an-
other who has had a similar experience validates the experience for both speaker
and listener. The practice of talking about experiences enables women to better
understand their seemingly isolated impressions and feelings by placing such im-
pressions and feelings in juxtaposition with other women's similar experiences.
It also helps women develop a new language to describe feelings previously un-
named. See generally Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills,
and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BuFF. L. REV. 1, 50
(1990).
24. Bartlett, supra note 1, at 863.
25. Id. at 863.
26. See generally id. at 854; Ann E. Freedman, Feminist Legal Method in Action:
Challenging Racism, Sexism and Homophobia In Law School, 24 GA. L. REv. 849,
850 (1990).
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consciousness-raising turn previously biased decisionmaking into a
more "intellectually honest" process that includes a woman's point of
view. Because this point of view may not always be admissible under
evidence rules, feminists generally advocate expanding relevancy
rules to include a woman's perspective. 2 7
Feminists want decisionmakers to acknowledge the insights de-
rived from "asking the woman question" and to use feminist practical
reasoning to correct bias against women within their decisionnak-
ing.2 8 Thus, feminists use feminist legal methods to get deci-
sionmakers to "ask the woman question" about their own
decisionmaking, and if the answers reveal bias, to employ feminist
practical reasoning.2 9 With the exception of radical feminists,3 0 how-
ever, most feminists do not advocate that the traditional legal method
be completely supplanted by feminist legal methods; instead they urge
the integration of feminist legal methods with traditional
jurisprudence.31
27. See generally Bartlett, supra note 1, at 836-37, 856-57. For a feminist critique of
other evidence rules, see Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv.
413.
28. Martha T. McCluskey, Privileged Violence, Principled Fantasy, and Feminist
Method: The Colby Fraternity Case, 44 ME. L. REV. 261, 265 (1992) ("Feminist
legal analysis hopes to contest not simply particular laws but also the agents and
terms of legal reality-making-and to change reality. Feminist method can help
demonstrate that justice requires dismantling a process of systemic denial, not
simply establishing new rules or presenting new facts.").
29. See generally Dennis, supra note 7, at 10 ("Feminist theory strives to introduce
better problem-solving methods than those currently employed in the male domi-
nated world.").
30. See, e.g., CArI1 u\TE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); MAcKINNON,
supra note 2; Bartlett, supra note 1, at 834 (citing Audre Lorde, The Master's
Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in SISTER OUTSIDER 110 (1984));
Robin West, The Ideal of Liberty: A Comment on Michael H. v. Gerald D., 139 U.
PA. L. REv. 1373 (1991) (arguing that relying on tradition constrains the Court's
interpretation of liberty); West, supra note 1, at 4 (arguing that true feminist
jurisprudence rejects male-oriented mainstream jurisprudence). For critical
analysis of defining progress in terms of opposition to tradition and the past, see
Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition, Change, and the Idea of Progress in Feminist
Legal Thought, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 303.
31. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Feminist Lawyering and Method, 16 LAw & Soc. IN-
QUIRY 373, 375 (1991) (feminist method contributes to the ongoing reformulations
of legal method); Bartlett, supra note 1, at 834, 836 ("Although permeated by
bias, these traditions ... have elements that should be taken seriously .... In
doing law, feminists like other lawyers use a full range of methods of legal rea-
soning-deduction, induction, analogy, and use of hypotheticals, policy, and other
general principles.") (citations omitted); Littleton, supra note 1, at 2 ("[Fleminist
jurisprudence criticizes the law's omission of and bias against women's concerns,
offering its insights as supplemental and corrective.") (emphasis added).
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III. PART TWO
This Part applies the three feminist legal methods explored in Part
One to the conflict between sexual harassment liability and the First
Amendment. It begins by providing background on and connections
between sexual harassment and First Amendment law, and then dem-
onstrates that "asking the woman question" about a successful First
Amendment defense to sexual harassment liability does identify some
bias against women. 32 It also demonstrates that by incorporating the
woman's point of view through feminist practical reasoning, the bias is
somewhat corrected. The ability of feminist legal methods to correct
bias within legal reasoning is a strength of the methods. This
strength, however, must be evaluated in juxtaposition with the inher-
ent weaknesses of feminist legal methods. These weaknesses are dis-
cussed in Part Three.
1. Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment
Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.33 In order to prove sexual harass-
ment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the harassment was unwel-
come and grounded in sexual hostility that is "sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive
working environment."34 The plaintiff usually offers sexually hostile
speech, including spoken or written words, as factual evidence of the
harassment. The court then evaluates these facts with subjective, ob-
32. Recall that feminists use the "asking the woman question" method to expose bias
against women in legal decisionmaking. See supra note 12 and accompanying
text.
33. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Title VII states that it is unlaw-
ful for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such in-
dividual's ... sex...." Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
34. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993) (reaffirming and quoting
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). For an extensive review of
the proof requirements for a hostile environment claim, see Sarah E. Burns, Evi-
dence of a Sexually Hostile Workplace: What is it and How Should it be Assessed
After Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.?, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357,
417-30 (1995); Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environ-
ment Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47
RuTGERs L. REv. 461, 492-501 (1995).
There is a second type of sexual harassment, "quid pro quo" harassment,
which is beyond the scope of this Article. "Quid pro quo" harassment exists
where submission to or refusal of unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, or any conduct of a sexual nature, is the basis of an employment decision.
See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (relying on 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(a) (1985) and Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir.
1994)).
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jective, and "totality of the circumstances" tests.3 5 If the court finds
sexual harassment, it may grant injunctive reliefP6 or order the em-
ployer to pay damages, including compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. 3 7 Obviously, through these remedies, the court regulates, or in
some instances prohibits, the speech of the employer.
Under the First Amendment, however, the government cannot reg-
ulate speech based on its content (which is usually the basis of a sex-
ual harassment claim) unless the regulation: 1) is narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling governmental interest,3 8 2) targets speech tradi-
tionally held to be "low value,"39 or 3) falls under the "secondary ef-
fects" doctrine.40 Arguing that certain sexually harassing speech does
not fall into any of the categories of speech that can be proscribed
based on content, some commentators assert that current sexual har-
assment law is inconsistent with the First Amendment.4 Not sur-
35. Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively
hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview.
Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to
be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the
victim's employment, and there is no Title VII violation.
... [W]hether an environment is "hostile" or "abusive" can be deter-
mined only by looking at all the circumstances. These may include the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physi-
cally threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work perform-
ance. The effect on the employee's psychological well-being is, of course,
relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environ-
ment abusive.
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993) (emphasis added).
36. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994).
37. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994).
38. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
39. The Court has defined certain types of speech as "low value" in the following deci-
sions: New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)(child pornography); Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)(defamation); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973)(obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)(incitement of unlaw-
ful conduct); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)(fighting words);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)(advocacy of unlawful conduct that
presents a clear and present danger).
40. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992) (regulation of a content-
defined subclass of proscribable speech permissible if the subclass is "associated
with particular 'secondary effects'.. . so that the regulation is justified without
reference to the content.., of the speech.'") (quoting Renton v. Playtime Thea-
tres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)).
41. See Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harass-
ment and the First Amendment, 52 Omo ST. L.J. 481, 513-31 (1991); Jules B.
Gerard, The First Amendment in a Hostile Environment: A Primer on Free
Speech and Sexual Harassment, 68 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1003, 1010-35 (1993);
Jessica M. Karner, Political Speech, Sexual Harassment, and a Captive Audience,
83 CAL. L. REv. 637, 645-71 (1995); Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Work-
place, 25 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 17-21 (1990); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1819-43 (1992).
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prisingly, other commentators argue that the First Amendment
should, in some circumstances, be a successful defense to sexual har-
assment liability.42 To date, no court has formally agreed.43
2. Application of Feminist Legal Methods: Would a First
Amendment Defense to Sexual Harassment Liability
Represent the Male Bias of Traditional Legal
Methods?
In this section I demonstrate how feminists could use feminist
legal methods to analyze and critique the effects of a successful First
Amendment defense to sexual harassment liability. Here, the import
of feminist legal methods would be to investigate whether the defense,
or the policies underlying it, embodies the maleness of traditional
legal methods. If the feminists' answers to "woman questions" reveal
that a successful First Amendment defense is biased against women,
then feminists would employ feminist practical reasoning and con-
sciousness-raising to supply a woman's perspective to counterbalance
the bias.
Feminists hope that by using their methods in this way, a court
faced with the issue of whether the First Amendment could be a de-
fense to sexual harassment liability would be compelled, at a mini-
mum, to employ feminist practical reasoning, if not "asking the
woman question" or consciousness-raising, to ensure that its decision-
making is not biased against women.44 To feminists, this would nec-
essarily be viewed as an improvement. While analysis of the First
Amendment defense may still reflect traditional legal methods, at
least a woman's point of view would have been considered.
A. "Asking the Woman Question"
To deconstruct the relationship between a successful First Amend-
ment defense and women, I have chosen to ask the following "woman
questions":
1) Does a successful First Amendment defense to sexual harassment lia-
bility serve any patriarchal interests?
2) What has been the effect on women of recent First Amendment
proposals?
42. See, e.g., Michael P. McDonald, Unfree Speech, 18 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 479,
485 (1995) ("Speech uttered that is not directed toward specific individuals
should never be regulated as harassment."); Wayne L. Robbins, Jr., When Two
Liberal Values Collide in an Era of "Political Correctness" First Amendment Pro-
tection as a Check on Speech-Based Title VII Hostile Environment Claims, 47
BAYLOR L. REv. 789 (1995).
43. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
44. Recall that one of the purposes of feminist legal methods is to identify and chal-
lenge bias in decisionmaldng and to raise the consciousness of decisionmakers.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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The first question examines the defense closely, attempting to expose
the real effects of it on working women. The second question takes a
broader look at the history of using the First Amendment to effectively
scale back, if not curtail, women's rights.
From a feminist perspective, answers to the first question reveal
that a successful First Amendment defense does serve patriarchal in-
terests; it diminishes women's rights, essentially furthers unequal
treatment between women and men, and effectively forces women, in
certain circumstances, to leave the workplace without recourse. 45 In
addition, because the defense would effectively scale back sexual har-
assment recovery, it signals to women that their well-being, while
once important,4 6 is now much less significant.
The potential First Amendment defense diminishes rights granted
to women by the Civil Rights Act. The Act, as interpreted by caselaw,
grants women the right to be free from sexual harassment in the
workplace.4 7 Pursuant to current caselaw, if this right is violated, the
sexually harassed woman may seek compensatory and punitive dam-
ages, as well as injunctive relief.48 A successful First Amendment de-
fense would, however, enable a man's right to free speech to eclipse
the rights of the sexually harassed woman, including the right to re-
cover for harm caused by the harassment.49 In turn, this result cre-
45. Although a First Amendment defense could be asserted by the employer/defend-
ant on behalf of a female employee accused of sexually harassing a male col-
league, most reported sexual harassment is directed by men toward women.
Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 n.19 (1st Cir. 1988)("Most
reported harassment is of women by men."); E=LEN J. WAGNER, SExUAL HARASS.
umEr N Tim WouPLAc 2 (1992). See also Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50
F.3d 428, 430 (1995)("Sexual harassment of women by men is the most common
kind.. . ."). Accordingly, my application is based on use of the defense against
female plaintiffs. Discussion of this defense being used against male victims of
sexual harassment is beyond the scope of this Article.
46. As Catharine MacKinnon put it: "The existence of a law against sexual harass-
ment has affected both the context of meaning within which social life is lived and
the concrete delivery of rights through the legal system. The sexually harassed
have been given a name for their suffering and an analysis that connects it with
gender. They have been given a forum, legitimacy to speak, authority to make
claims, and an avenue for possible relief. Before, what happened to them was all
right. Now it is not." MACKiNNON, FE MIqism UNMODIFIED, supra note 30, at 103-
04.
47. See supra note 33.
48. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
49. Many women experience intense feelings of powerlessness, anger, and frustration
as a result of being sexually harassed. Many also suffer from severe emotional
and psychological problems, including depression, anxiety, irritability, loss of
self-esteem, vulnerability, shame, guilt, and loss of sexual interest. See generally
CATHARINE A. MACKiNNON, ONLY WoRDs (1993); Aileen V. Kent, Note, First
Amendment Defense to Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: Does Discrimi-
natory Conduct Deserve Constitutional Protection?, 23 HoFSTRA L. REv. 513, 514
(1994)(citing Barbara A. Gutek & Mary P. Koss, Changed Women and Changed
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ates a working environment in which men and women are
unjustifiably treated differently. Such disparate treatment caused by
a successful First Amendment defense would completely undermine
Title VIrs prohibition against discrimination based upon gender.50
Invoking a broader perspective on the relationship between First
Amendment law and women, the second question, "what has been the
effect on women of recent First Amendment proposals?," may be used
to expose a pattern of using the (allegedly) neutral principles of the
First Amendment to oppress women. Recent proposals in the name of
the First Amendment have trivialized the rights and dignity of wo-
men. For example, women's reproductive rights defined in Roe v.
Wade5l and Planned Parenthood v. Casey52 have, in some instances,
been diluted by free speech rights of "right to life" protestors. 53 And,
as extensively documented by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin, to the extent that free speech protects pornography, it ig-
nores and exacerbates women's painful reality of being made (by men)
the ultimate sex object.54
Thus, for feminists, asking and answering "woman questions"
reveals that a successful First Amendment defense to sexual harass-
ment furthers patriarchal interests at the expense of women's rights
and well-being. In addition, answers to "woman questions" show that
recent First Amendment proposals perpetuate women's life exper-
iences of oppression, rather than eradicating them. Accordingly, by
using the "asking the woman question" method, feminists could argue
that a successful First Amendment defense would represent the evils
of traditional legal methods-preserving male power structures and
neglecting a woman's point of view.
Organizations: Consequences of and Coping with Sexual Harassment, 42 J. VOCA-
TioNAL BEHAV. 28, 28-35 (1993)). A successful First Amendment defense would
effectively diminish recovery for these damages.
50. See supra note 33.
51. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
52. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
53. For an overview of how courts have accommodated the competing rights of abor-
tion and free speech, see John W. Bencivenga, Comment, Constitutional Law-
When Rights Collide: Buffer Zones and Abortion Clinics-Madsen v. Women's
Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994), 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 695 (1995) and
Courtland L. Reichman, Federal Remedies for Abortion Protest: Discordance of
First Principles, 44 EMoRY L.J. 773 (1995). For the argument that the Freedom
of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 violates the First Amendment, see Jill
W. Rose & Chris Osborn, Face-ial Neutrality: A Free Speech Challenge to the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 81 VA. L. Rv. 1505 (1995).
54. See Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and
Equality, 8 HI- v. WobEN's L.J. 1 (1985); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography,
Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HIv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rnv. 1 (1985).
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B. Feminist Practical Reasoning and Consciousness-Raising
Feminist practical reasoning and consciousness-raising could, if
implemented, correct these evils underlying the potential First
Amendment defense by forcing a court to consider the real effects of a
successful defense: an increase in discrimination against women and
in the suffering of women who are victims of sexual harassment. Both
feminist practical reasoning and consciousness-raising methods at-
tempt to provide the context in which a decisionmaker could evaluate,
from a feminist perspective, the merits of his or her decisionmaking.
Feminist practical reasoning would demand that the rights and life
situations of all parties, including those of the employer, employee,
and the sexually harassed woman, be considered. Consciousness-rais-
ing would then provide accurate depictions of the sexually harassed
woman's real-life experiences. 55 By employing feminist practical rea-
soning and consciousness-raising in this way, a decisionmaker would
be forced to consider the context in which a successful First Amend-
ment defense would trump women's interests. As a result, if a deci-
sionmaker were to allow the defense, according to feminists, he or she
would have to justify the defense in light of its negative effect on
women.
Thus, feminist legal methods may fulfill their promise to expose
and correct bias within traditional legal methods. Using feminist
legal methods, feminists may argue that a successful First Amend-
ment defense discriminates against women and is thus biased against
women. Feminists may also use feminist legal methods to supply the
missing woman's point of view to counterbalance the bias inherent in
a successful First Amendment defense.
There are, however, two conditions necessary for this successful
implementation of feminist legal methods: 1) feminist legal methods
must be able to distinguish bias against women from bias that is
favorable to women, and 2) decisionmakers must actually employ fem-
inist legal methods. But how is a decisionmaker to know when the
bias is against women and when the bias favors women? And can fem-
inists actually persuade decisionmakers to employ feminist legal
methods? The next section, Part Three, uses the application set forth
above to demonstrate that asking these questions about feminist legal
methods exposes inherent weaknesses in the use of these methods.
IV. PART THREE: A CRITIQUE
In this Part, I argue that feminist legal methods fail to fulfill their
promise because: 1) they cannot distinguish bias against women, or
"bad bias," from bias that is advantageous to women, or "good bias";
55. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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and 2) they cannot convince many decisionmakers to employ feminist
legal methods. After making this argument, I identify and respond to
possible objections by feminists to my critique.
1. Feminist Legal Methods Fail to Distinguish Bad Bias From
Good Bias
One of the goals of feminist legal methods is to expose and elimi-
nate bias against women.56 Feminists do not, however, want to ex-
pose or eliminate any bias that may be favorable to women.57 Because
feminists want to purge only bad bias from decisionmaking, feminist
legal methods must distinguish bias against women from bias that fa-
vors women. Feminist legal methods do not, however, distinguish bad
bias from good bias.
Although, as demonstrated in Part Two, "asking the woman ques-
tion" about a successful First Amendment defense may reveal bias, it
does not expose that bias as bad or good. "Asking the woman ques-
tion" demands that the person asking the question "search" for bias
within the potential First Amendment defense; it does not, however,
lead to normative judgments about whether the bias, if found, is bad
or good. Rather it is the answers, reflecting the personal bias of the
person employing the method, that identify the bias as either bad or
good. For example, when I asked the "woman questions" about a suc-
cessful First Amendment defense, my answers did not flow from ask-
ing the "woman questions"; rather, they were dictated by the
conclusions I ultimately wanted to draw, i.e., a successful defense re-
flects bad bias against women. There was nothing about "asking the
woman question" that led me to that conclusion. "Asking the woman
question" exposes bad bias only when the person answering the ques-
56. In fact, feminist legal methods would be ineffective if there were no "bad bias" to
expose. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 847 ("asking the woman question... has
substantive consequences only if the law is not gender-neutral") (emphasis
added).
57. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 847 ("The bias of the [asking the woman question]
method is the bias toward uncovering a certain kind of bias. The bias disadvan-
tages those who are otherwise benefited by law and legal methods whose gender
implications are not revealed. If this is 'bias,' feminists must insist that it is
'good' (or 'proper') bias, not 'bad.' ").
Patricia Cain has also addressed this point:
I take it that "bias"... can be both good and bad. To the extent a bias is
a personal preference, something a person has affection for, it is some-
thing we want to acknowledge and celebrate about human personal-
ity.... On the other hand, to the extent a person's bias constitutes
bigotry, prejudice, or intolerance, we certainly do not want to celebrate
it. Thus we might say that whereas we want judges who have affections
for things, we do not want judges who are prejudiced. We want the good
bias, but not the bad one.
Patricia Cain, Comment, Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist Theory
and Judging, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1945, 1946 (1988) (emphasis added).
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tion knows what bad bias is and is motivated by personal or political
reasons to find it. The method itself does not inform the deci-
sionmaker how to distinguish bad bias from good bias. For feminists,
the method makes sense because feminists want to find bad bias. But
for decisionmakers who do not adopt a feminist perspective, the
method is merely a set of questions, with the right answers ultimately
revealed by feminists themselves, not by their methods.
Similar to "asking the woman question," feminist practical reason-
ing does not designate certain biases as bad and others as good. It is
only the feminist spin on contextual reasoning that identifies whether
any bias within decisioninaking is bad or good. Lastly, consciousness-
raising serves as a depository, accepting all kinds of women's views
and experiences concerning sexual harassment. There is no judgment
placed on women's experiences in terms of which experiences would be
considered to reflect bad or good bias. Rather they are provided to the
decisionmaker for comparison to his or her personal accounts of the
sexually harassed woman's life situation.
Even if the methods worked the way feminists claim they would,
they are only effective if decisionmakers actually employ them. This
brings me to the second weakness in feminist legal methods: there is
nothing inherent in these methods that persuades many deci-
sionmakers to employ them.
2. Feminist Legal Methods Lack Crucial Links Necessary to
Convince Many Decisionmakers to Employ Them
Ultimately, feminists, believing that women matter, want the in-
sights of feminist legal methods to affect legal decisionmaking. They
hope that by using their methods as an example of how to expose and
correct some of the bad bias against women inherent in traditional
legal methods, decisionmakers will also be persuaded to apply femi-
nist methods. But urging through example that decisionmakers apply
feminist legal methods is simply not enough. It merely demands that•
decisionmakers believe that women matter and use the methods be-
cause feminists say so. This justification is not, however, always
persuasive.
Feminists advocating the use of feminist legal methods correctly
assume that women do matter; but most feminists erroneously con-
clude that because women matter, there should be a universal commit-
ment by decisionmakers to eliminate bad bias against women, even at
the expense of supplanting First Amendment values. Feminists can-
not assume that the agents of law will care enough about the sexually
harassed woman to make such a commitment, and feminist legal
methods do not and cannot convince decisionmakers to do so either.
No matter how horrific the experiences of sexual harassment, femi-
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nists cannot assume that decisionmakers will care more about women
than deeply embedded First Amendment values.58
3. Anticipating Feminist Objections
Feminists might object to this critique in three ways. They might
argue that: 1) decisionmakers can identify bad bias, 2) the emergence
and use of feminist legal methods do make decisionmakers become
committed to eradicating bias against women, and 3) because feminist
legal methods at least identify some bad bias against women, the deci-
sionmakers already committed to eradicating bad bias will employ the
methods. Below, I respond to each argument respectively, and con-
clude that, in the end, they are unpersuasive.
The first objection feminists may have is that decisionmakers can
easily identify bad bias, especially when using feminist legal methods.
Bad bias exists when women are excluded, made to feel inferior, sub-
jected to male hierarchy, generally treated unfairly as compared to
other groups, or, collectively, to borrow from Catharine MacKinnon,
when women are hurt.59 However, in the same way that feminist
legal methods cannot distinguish bad bias from good bias, feminist
legal methods cannot accurately determine whether certain legal deci-
sions actually hurt women.
In addition, feminists may argue that decisionmakers can identify
bad bias within a potential First Amendment defense by simply refer-
ring to general feminist opinions on whether the defense reflects bad
bias against or good bias for women. Unfortunately, for such deci-
sionmakers, there are conflicting feminist opinions on this issue. Na-
dine Strossen, for example, represents the view that favoring First
Amendment values over sexual harassment liability is good bias be-
cause restrictions on workplace sexual harassment are paternalistic,
reminiscent of protective legislation, and undermine gender equal-
ity.60 Yet other feminists argue the opposite: favoring the First
Amendment over women is bad bias because it favors ideas over peo-
58. Andrea Dworkin makes a similar point:
The accounts of rape, wife beating, forced childbearing, medical butcher-
ing, sex-motivated murder, forced prostitution, physical mutilation, sa-
distic psychological abuse, and the other commonplaces of female
experience... should leave the heart seared, the mind in anguish, the
conscience in upheaval. But they do not. No matter how often these sto-
ries are told, with whatever clarity or eloquence, bitterness or sorrow,
they might as well have been whispered in wind or written in sand: they
disappear, as if they were nothing.
ANDREA DwonmN, RiGHT-wING WOMEN 20 (1983) (emphasis added).
59. See generally MACKNON, FENaNSM UNMIODIFIED, supra note 30.
60. Nadine Strossen, Regulating Workplace Sexual Harassment and Upholding the
First Amendment-Avoiding A Collision, 37 V.L. L. REv. 757, 777-82 (1992).
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ple.6 1 Because of these divisions within legal feminism, it may be im-
possible for feminist legal methods, even with mechanisms attempting
to distinguish bad bias from good bias, to ever clearly divide bad bias
from good bias.
A second objection by feminists may be that the emergence of femi-
nist legal methods may in fact convince decisionmakers to employ
feminist legal methods. Katharine Bartlett explains that:
"[rleasoning from context [as feminist legal methods do] can change
perceptions about the world, which may then further expand the con-
texts within which such reasoning seems appropriate, which in turn
may lead to still further changes in perceptions."62 Bartlett's reason-
ing is too optimistic. Reasoning through context, or exposing and/or
telling stories about bias, may, at most, make a decisionmaker sympa-
thetic to, and perhaps empathetic with, women's plight. But, unless a
decisionmaker is already committed to feminist goals in law, narra-
tives about bias do not automatically move, persuade, or compel deci-
sionmakers to eradicate bad bias against women. 63 This is true for
anyone in a powerful position with decisionmaking authority.64 A
61. MACKI ON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 30, at 103 (emphasizing the
harm to women from sexual harassment, implicitly arguing that people matter
more than speech, and concluding that a conflict exists "between those who value
speech in the abstract more than value people in the concrete"); Keith R.
Fentonmiller, Verbal Sexual Harassment as Equality Depriving Conduct, 27 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 565 (1994); Scales, supra note 14, at 18-19; Kent, supra note 49.
For an overview of tension within feminism surrounding the potential First
Amendment defense, compare Strauss, supra note 41 (cautioning feminists about
minimizing the value of free speech and arguing that if sexist speech is not di-
rected at a particular woman and is not discriminatory, then it should be pro-
tected by the First Amendment) and Amicus Brief of Feminists for Free
Expression, Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430 (C.D.
Cal. 1994) (arguing against prohibiting pornography in the workplace because of
the risk that it may foster stereotypes of women as fragile, vulnerable, and asex-
ual) with MAcKiNNON, supra note 30; Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist
Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989); Sangree,
supra note 34; and Kent, supra note 49.
62. Bartlett, supra note 1, at 863 (emphasis added).
63. Jennifer Nedelsky and Carol Smart have argued the same point. See CAROL
SMART, FEMINISM AND TE POWER OF THE LAw 72 (1989) ("[We cannot simply rely
on experience as if it were a concrete reality which merely needs to be exposed
thereby circumventing the problems and difficulties of intellectual work."); Nedel-
sky, supra note 13, at 1300 ("showing how a policy will clearly harm women will
not change the minds of those who simply do not care about women's ... well
being.... ."). See also DwomcN, supra note 58, at 20-21 (Regardless of how often
women tell their stories of oppression, they will not be recognized by men who do
not believe women are significant beings).
64. For example, consider an associate in a law firm who, upon discovering she is
pregnant with twins, requests from a female partner twice the allotted pregnancy
leave. The associate begins her argument with personal experience stories con-
cerning childbirth and taking care of an infant. The associate then reminds the
partner how difficult it was when she (the partner) was taking care of her new-
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decisionmaker may be moved by listening to real-life experiences of a
sexually harassed woman. But given the competing First Amendment
values, a decisionmaker may not, absent a preexisting and over-
whelming commitment to feminist goals, be persuaded to employ femi-
nist legal methods.
Even if a decisionmaker has a preexisting commitment to feminist
goals, this still may not be enough to convince that decisionmaker to
employ feminist legal methods. If decisionmakers are truly committed
to feminist concerns and to addressing those concerns with feminist
legal methods, they may reject the methods, somewhat ironically, as
representing male ways of thinking.
Feminist legal methods represent the "maleness" of traditional
legal methods in two ways. First, they exclude "other" points of view.
Feminism rejects exclusivity as male,65 and insists that there is no
one feminist theory.66 Yet some feminists advocate using only femi-
nist methods, 67 or, being even more "exclusive," feminists like Catha-
rine MacKinnon advocate the use of only one feminist method,
consciousness-raising. 68 Further, "asking the woman question" and
consciousness-raising include only a woman's point of view as repre-
born, and concludes with a plea for the partner to "put herself in the associate's
shoes" and imagine tending to twins. The partner may be moved by hearing
about the associate's experience and remembering her own experience, but given
all the other factors, including the competing issue of productivity, she may not,
unless perhaps she has a preexisting commitment to feminist goals in the work-
place, feel compelled to grant the associate the extra maternity leave. Granted,
the partner's memories and the associate's stories may make the partner's deci-
sion more difficult, but it in no way guarantees that the partner would actually
grant the associate's request.
For a critique of "feminist visions of" empathy, see Cynthia V. Ward, A
Kinder, Gentler Liberalism? Visions of Empathy in Feminist and Communitar-
ian Literature, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 929, 953 (1994) ("[W]hile those at the bottom
have strong incentive to learn empathic understanding of those at the top, the
reverse is not automatically true. And without reciprocation from the powerful,
empathy would almost certainly have the effect of keeping the powerless at the
bottom. Where such 'bottom-up' empathy is present, perhaps even prevalent, im-
aginative empathy alone, while able to recognize diversity, cannot produce social
or political equality.").
65. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 2, at xiii (exclusionary methods like rights are
male, limited, and limiting).
66. See, e.g., DEBORAH RHODE, JusTIcE AND GENDER (1989).
67. See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method
Makes, 41 STAN. L. REv. 751, 752-53, 763 (1989) (reviewing CATHARiNE MAcKIN-
NON, FPEUSMis UNMODIFIED (1987)) ("MacKinnon justifiably believes that the
substance of feminist jurisprudence can only be developed through the unique
mechanism of inquiry known as feminist method.. .- the essence of MacKinnon's
view on 'feminisms' comes down to a single choice: feminist method or not....
MacKinnon recognizes only... [feminist method] as an appropriate tool for femi-
nist theory.") (emphasis added); Scales, supra note 1.
68. MAcKINNoN, supra note 2, at 83 ("feminist method is consciousness-raising");
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An
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sentative of truth, and exclude all other interested parties' views.
Specifically, the "woman question," by not asking other questions, ex-
cludes the views of others, such as the poor, handicapped, racial mi-
norities, and homosexuals, except to the extent that members of those
classes are also women. My point is not that "woman questions"
should include these viewpoints, but rather that "asking the woman
question" embodies the male exclusiveness of traditional legal
methods.
Second, feminist legal methods represent the maleness of tradi-
tional legal methods because the methods are grounded in hierarchi-
cal thinking. Feminists attack hierarchical thinking as male,69 yet
"asking the woman question" elevates women's issues over those af-
fecting poverty, disability, racism, homophobia, and other public inter-
est matters. Also, feminist practical reasoning, by displacing
objectivity and abstraction (methods associated with male thinking)
with contextual thinking (methods associated with female thinking),70
elevates women's ways of thinking over men's ways of thinking.
Lastly, consciousness-raising privileges experiences of women as
"truth" over other groups. 71 Because of their inherent exclusionary
and hierarchical nature, feminist legal methods operate at cross-pur-
poses with feminist principles of inclusion (over exclusion) and cooper-
ation (over hierarchy). Thus a decisionmaker committed to true
feminist values may choose not to employ feminist methods because
feminist reasoning reveals them as too "male."
V. PART FOUR: SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING
FEMINIST STRATEGIES IN LAW
Feminists using the law to improve women's lives have many
goals, one of which (for some) is to preserve injunctive relief against,
and monetary recovery for, sexual harassment in the workplace.
However, in order to achieve this goal, feminists must persuade deci-
sionmakers to disallow the First Amendment as a defense to sexual
harassment liability.
An underlying question explored throughout this Article is
whether feminist legal methods effectively persuade decisionmakers.
Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 519-20 (1982) (consciousness-raising is the femi-
nist method).
69. See, e.g., West, supra note 1.
70. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A D IFFERENT VoicE (1982).
71. As Judith Grant put it: "it is unclear why the experiences of women' would count
more heavily than those of any group as being 'true' measures of reality." JuDrrH
GRANT, FuNDmNTAL FxmInsm 43 (1993). See also Owen M. Fiss, The Law
Regained, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 253 (1989) ("No persuasive argument has
ever been offered to explain why [consciousness-raising] is the only method for
discovering the truth .... ).
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As demonstrated above, feminist legal methods may not be a sound
mode of argument because the methods do not distinguish bad bias
from good bias. In addition, feminist legal methods may not convince
many decisionmakers to employ them. Thus, and as more thoroughly
discussed below, feminists should not rely on the belief that they must
ground their arguments, or part of their arguments, in feminist legal
methods. Instead, feminists should employ reasoning that resonates
with the decisionmakers. In this way, feminist arguments would be
grounded in terms familiar and understandable to decisionmakers,
and thus be more persuasive.
1. Feminists Should Abandon the Belief that Feminist Goals in
Law Must Be Obtained Exclusively Through Feminist
Methods
Although feminists aim to fulfill feminist goals in law, it does not
follow that feminist strategies must flow from feminist methods. At
the time feminists first pronounced their critiques of law, it made
sense to emphasize feminist methods as symbolic of and as a means to
enunciate feminist goals. This rationale is now less important. Femi-
nists have clearly set forth their critique of the law. Thus, feminists
can, when appropriate, move away from feminist legal methods and
achieve feminist goals without always using feminist methods.
I am cognizant of the argument that to abandon feminist legal
methods and use traditional reasoning is to validate the evils flowing
therefrom.72 This argument must, however, be evaluated in light of
the reality that feminists who rely solely on feminist legal methods do
so at the risk of utterly failing to persuade certain decisionmakers.
2. Feminists Should Employ Reasoning that Resonates with
Decisionmakers
Feminists should develop arguments against the First Amendment
defense based on First Amendment and sexual harassment reasoning
and precedent amenable to the Supreme Court as it is currently com-
posed. Because the Court has not explicitly decided whether the regu-
lation of sexual harassment should be scrutinized as conduct, content-
based regulation, or content-neutral regulation,73 feminists have
many viable theories of permissible regulation upon which to base
their arguments. Sarah Burns has already begun work in this area by
suggesting alternative theories upon which to regulate speech under-
lying sexual harassment claims. For example, Burns argues that ver-
bal, visual, or symbolic conduct serving as the basis for hostile
environment claims is workplace conduct rather than speech thus
72. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 11.
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eliminating First Amendment inquiry altogether. 74 Alternatively,
Burns and others argue that even if the regulation of speech underly-
ing sexual harassment is content-based (thereby implicating the First
Amendment), then the infringement on sexually hostile workplace
speech is constitutional because eliminating employment discrimina-
tion should be a compelling governmental interest.75
Feminists may also base arguments against a potential First
Amendment defense to sexual harassment liability on the First
Amendment precedent of content-neutral speech regulation.76 One
theory underlying permissible content-neutral regulation that may be
explored by feminists is the secondary-effects doctrine. Pursuant to
this doctrine, as explained by the Supreme Court in City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., speech like pornography in adult theatres
may be regulated if the regulation is targeted at the secondary effects
of pornography, i.e., its harmful effects, and not at the content of the
speech. 77 Similarly, relying on the precedent of City of Renton, regu-
lation of sexually harassing speech may be permissible if the regula-
tion targets the secondary effects of such speech-the emotional and
psychological harm it causes women.7 8
Lastly, feminists may argue, as have other commentators and
scholars, 79 that regulation of sexual harassment is permissible under
the captive audience doctrine. Pursuant to this doctrine, the govern-
74. See Burns, supra note 34, at 413.
75. See Burns, supra note 34, at 415; Fentonmiller, supra note 61; Sangree, supra
note 34, at 531; Kent, supra note 49, at 532-35 (arguing by implication that the
harmful effects of sexual harassment on women denies women equal employment
opportunity, and that preventing discrimination in the workplace is a compelling
governmental interest).
76. Recall that the court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell unanimously hinted in dicta that
prohibiting sexual speech at work is permissible content-neutral regulation
under the First Amendment. See supra note 11.
77. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
78. See MAcKINNON, FEMiNsM UNMODIFIED, supra note 30, at 103; MACKINNON,
supra note 49. For further discussion exploring the harmful effects of sexual har-
assment against women, see Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment:
Equality, Objectivity and the Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 EMORY L.J. 151
(1994).
79. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches
to the First Amendment, 1990 DuKE L.J. 375, 422; Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43
STAN. L. REV. 813 (1991); Karner, supra note 41 at 678-91; Cathleen Marie
Mogan, Current Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Law: Time to Stop De-
fendants from Having Their Cake and Eating it Too, 6 NOTm DAmE J.L. ETIcs
& PuB. PoL'Y 543, 573 (1992); Strauss, supra note 41, at 49 (Although setting
forth circumstances in which sexist speech in the workplace should be protected,
she also argues that "sexist speech [in the workplace] can be regulated... if the
offended listener constitutes a captive audience.").
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ment may proscribe speech directed at a captive audience.80 Femi-
nists may argue that female employees at work are a captive
audience,S1 and thus regulation of sexually harassing speech aimed at
them is permissible.
Because any one of the above arguments may, without the use of
feminist legal methods, persuade the current Court to deny a First
Amendment defense to sexual harassment, it would be foolish not to
employ them as either supplemental to or alternatives to feminist
legal methods.
VI. CONCLUSION
Feminist methods in law are crucial to the success of feminist goals
in law. However, the feminist goal of defeating a First Amendment
defense to sexual harassment liability will remain unattainable if
methods used by feminists are not persuasive enough to compel a deci-
sion favoring the status quo of sexual harassment liability. This Arti-
cle has argued that feminist legal methods alone are not enough to
persuade decisionmakers to care about the impact on women of a suc-
cessful First Amendment defense to sexual harassment.
"Asking the woman question" demands application of legal rules
that do not perpetuate women's subordination.82 Feminist practical
reasoning insists that decisionmakers no longer mask political and so-
cial considerations.8 3 Consciousness-raising informs the law if it has
"gotten it wrong" concerning women's experiences.84 It is empowering
for feminists to describe feminist legal methods this way. But, as fem-inists are well aware, reality is what is important. This Article seeks
to discover what real results feminist legal methods can achieve. For
feminists, feminist legal methods represent their agenda, and that is
perhaps persuasive enough to keep feminists working together toward
common goals.S5 But for nonfeminists, the audience to which femi-
nists should be speaking, feminist legal methods and their symbolic
80. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978)(plurality opinion); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298
(1974)(plurality opinion).
81. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535 (M.D. Fla.
1991)("'Few audiences are more captive than the average worker.' ")(quoting
Balkin, supra note 79, at 423); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 503 F. Supp. 383,
402 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
82. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
84. See generally supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
85. William N. Eskridge makes a similar point: "Many narrative scholars emphasize
that the consciousness-raising feminist methodology serves as the inspiration for
their scholarship." William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 607, 608-09 n.5 (1994) (using Kathryn Abrams and Toni Massaro as exam-
ples to support his statement).
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significance are not talismanic. Decisionmakers will more likely be
persuaded by reasoning that is familiar to them than by narratives
filled with emotive content, but lacking universal and convincing
appeal.
Although this Article urges continued evaluation of feminist legal
methods in relation to their capacity to fulfill feminist goals, it also
attempts to provide recommendations for improving feminist strate-
gies in law. Feminists ought to invoke a variety of methods in an effort
to obtain their goals. This approach means using feminist legal meth-
ods where appropriate-with decisionmakers who have a preexisting
commitment to feminist goals in law. It does not mean, however, rely-
ing exclusively on feminist legal methods. Clearly, feminist legal
methods can show that the law treats women as if they "don't matter,"
but they cannot demonstrate that women "should matter." Given this
weakness, feminists must look beyond feminist legal methods for
strategies to fulfill feminist goals in law.
